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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
STATE TAX COI1NISSION,
STATE OF UTAH,

)
)
)

Plaintiff and Respondent, )
-vsWARREN S. WRIGHT,
Defendant and Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
ON APPEAL
Civil No. 15931

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The sole issue to be decided on appeal is Judge
Winder's denial of Appellant's untimely motion to dismiss a
Supplemental Order and/or the Utah State Tax Commission's
warrant of judgment.

Appellant collaterally attempts to

interject the issue of the constitutionality of the entire
Utah income tax law.

This issue is not properly before the

Court but the Appellant will briefly address it.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Defendant's motion to dismiss the Utah State Tax
Commission's tax warrant and a lawful District Court Supplemental
Order was denied.
date.

The Supplemental Order was continued without
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests this court to affirm the District
Court's order of denial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent does not agree when Appellant asserts that
the "married" classification for State Income Tax Law purposes
is not based on marital status but personal life
classification is based on the "ability to pay."

~t_Yle.

The

Respondent

also asserts that due process was not denied Appellant.
The essential facts are stated in the "Dispositioo
in the Lower Court."
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT PORTION OF THE UTAH INCOME TAX LAW PROVIDING
OTHER RATES FOR MARRIED COUPLES FILING JOINTLY
IS NOT AN ARBITRARY AND UNREASONABLE LEGISLATIVE
CLASSIFICATION
Appellant argues that Section 59-l4A-5 of the Utah
Code (1973) allowing married couples to file a joint income
tax return violates Article I, Section 24 of the Utah
Constitution.

Section 24 aprovides that "all laws of a

general nature shall have uniform operation. "

Appellant

contends that income tax laws are general laws and that utah'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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basis.
The law concerning legislative classifications and
uniformity is quite clear:
An act is never unconstitutional because of
discrimination so long as there is some reasonable
basis for differentiation between classes which
is related to the purposes to be accomplished by
the act. And it applies uniformly to all persons
within the class .
. In fixing the limits of the class, the legislatlve body has a wide discretion and this court may
not concern itself with the wisdom or policy of the
law. Our function is to determine whether ·an
enactment operates equally upon all persons similarly situated. If it does, then the discrimination is within permissive legislative limits.
Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement System Board of Administration, 246 P. 2d 591 (Utah 1952).
~ve also hold the tax does not violate the
"uniformity clause" Section 24, Article I, of the
state constitution. The significance of this
clause is well expressed on pp. 818, 819 of Vol.
5, Calif. Jurisprudence where it states:
"The
word 'uniform' in the section of the constitution
under consideration does not mean universal. The
provision intends simply that the effect of
general laws shall be the same upon all persons
who stand in the same relation to the law. It
ha3 been repeatedly held that a law is general
11hich applie3 to all of a class--t~e classification
be~ng a prop~r one--and that the requirements of
uniformity is satisfied if it applies to all of
the class alike."

As applied to taxation statutes such constitutional
provision requires only that the tax shall fall upon
all similarly situated.
Untermyer v. State Tax Commission, 129 P. 2d 881 (Utah 1942).
The utah income tax law is uniformly applied with
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respect to the "married filing jointly" classification,
i.e., the law applies equally to all persons in that
class.

There is also a "reasonable basis" for differentiating

between married persons and others.
Hansen, supra, noted, the court's role is not to
second guess the wisdom of the legislature, but to determine
if the legislature has acted with some reasonable basis.
court held in State v. J. B.
766

(Utah 1941) that "

&

This

R. E. Walker, Inc., 116 P. 2d

one who assails a legts1ative

classification as arbitrary has the burden of showing it to
be such."

In order to prevail, Appellant has a strong burden

of prooi to convince this court that there is no reasonable
basis whatsoever justifying the classification in question.
No credible evidence has been put before this court to establi;
Appellant's case.

His "naked" assertions such as "now in at

least half the married households both parties are employed
outside the home and at the same time average family size has
decreased substantially," are not evidence.

(Appellant 1 s

true th2 "ability to pay" classification is uniform anJ
reasonable.
Appellant merely relies on his own perceptions as
to how the law should be.
(Appellant's brief p. 10).

He admits t_ha t he can 1 t prove them.
He pits his ovm wisdom against th:

of the legislature and asks this court to accept it.
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This Court, as others have, can take judicial notice
of the fact that married couples (two persons) generally have
greater expenses than single persons and that children generally
result from marriage relationships and create additional
expense.

This fact alone provides a basis for the tax statute

passed by the legislature.
In Sowders v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 552 P. 2d 698
(Okla. 1976), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held Oklahoma's
separate income tax rate for married persons filing jointly to
be constitutional.

The court recognized that married couples

generally have greater financial burdens than single persons
and held that "ability to pay" provided a reasonable basis
for separate treatment by the tax law.
Sowders, supra, discussed in detail and considered
persuasive the Tax Court of Kellems v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 58 T.C. 556 (1972).

In Kellems, as in Sowders and

the case at bar, the claimant was a single person who attacked
the constitutionality of the joint return and claimed a
refund.

The court gave geographical uniformity as a reason

fo~ the federal joint return but then immediately added the

constitutional basis for the separate classification:
More importantly, however, Congres~ was.wi~hin
the bounds of its constitutional role s1nce 1t 1S
conceivable Congress believed that married pers~ns
generally have greater financial burdens than s1ng~e
persons.
The recogni~ion of s~ch greater burdens 1s
certainly consonant w1th taxat1on based on the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ability to pay, which has long been an important
objective of the income tax scheme.
The degree
of recognition given by Congress to the problem of
greater financial burdens on the part of the marri~
taxpayers was also within the discretion of Congress
since it does not appear arbitrary or unreasonable.
(Emphasis added. )
That case was affirmed by the United States Circuit court of
Appeals, 2nd Circuit, in Kellems v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 474 F. 2d 1399 (1973) by a per curiam decision
. on the basis of the Tax Court's opinion below."
Certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme-court,
414 U.S. 831, 94 S. Ct. 63, 38 L. Ed 2d 66

(1973).

Sowders

and Kellems are recent cases (1976 and 1973 respectively) whict.
are

s~~:l

persuasive.

Appellant argues that the "married persons" classification should fall because it does not include two groups of
individuals in particular, i.e., couples living together,
but unmarried and "head of households."
Hansen, supra, gives the legal rationale why the
existence of some unmarried couples living together does not
defeat th~ classification at issue:

"The fact that the borderline cases * * *
may not be distinguishable does not render the
whole classification unjust discrimination * * *
It is often necessary in order to make classifications to draw an arbitrary line between the
two classes."
It is against public policy in Utah where the man and woman
live together, either by themselves or with their children,
on a permanent basis, without 0etting legally married.
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Therefore,

the unclean hands theory of law applies, not to mention,

the problems of defining and regulating who would qualify for
this status would greatly increase the administrative burden.
The "ability to pay" concept provides a rational
basis to differentiate between the "married" class and "head
of households."

Aside from dependants, the "married" class

always has one more person, i.e., the marriage partner.

The

fact that a piece of legislation setting up a particular class
for "remedial purposes does not remedy every needfur situation
does not affect the validity of that class as long as there
exists a reasonable basis to differentiate it.
139 N.W.

2d 585

State v. Morgan,

(Wis. 1966) reflects this principle.

The

court, in upholding the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute
providing certain income tax credits and refunds to persons
over 65 stated:
While it is undoubtedly true that some persons
under the.age of sixty-five are equally de~erving
of relief there are undoubtedly other dev~ces by
which the,legislature has or could, if it so desired,
grant other forms of relief or ~ssistance . . The
mere fact that the legislature 1n the exerc1se
.
of a proper police-power function has not ~een ~lt
C:o cur"' or attempt to alleviate all the ev~ls or
poverty in a single piece of legislation does not
render the classification used reasonable.
The same arguments against non-married couples apply also to
"head of households."

The question of giving separate tax

rate status to "head of households" and others should be left
to the legislature.
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The "ability to pay" concept pervades income tax
law on both the state and federal levels.
The law is complex.

Differing rates, credits, refunds

exemptions, etc. all reflect the "ability to pay" concept and
other goals of the income tax law.

The complexity of the tax

law requires that the legislature's judgments be given deferenc
by the courts.
The classification is based on reason, it is not
arbitrary and without justification and the law act:s· uniformly
upon those within the class.
The rational, uniform and reasonable classifications
of married couples for income tax purposes is not a special
or private law in violation of Article VI, Section 26 of the
Utah Constitution nor does it violate equal protection of the
law.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION
TO DIS1HSS 'ill\.S PROPER AND REASO"!ABLE AND, THERErORF., SI!OULD BE SUSTAINED
Any legislative act is presumed to be constitutionall'
valid unless and until clearly shown it held not to be.

That

argument and those made in Point I were heard and sustained
by the Court below.

Such is clearly the law.
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The Appellant's "statement" was taken to be in the
form of a Motion to Dismiss by the Court, to accomodate the
Appellant.
The record shows that the procedure anu motion was
not proper pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure or Chapter
59 of the Utah Code.

The Court was, therefore, clearly

proper in denying the motion.
The Trial Court's denial of the "Motion to Dismiss"
was also reasonable in light of the legal arguments'made there,
which are essentially the same ones made here.

This Court

has previously ruled and upheld our state income tax laws.
See State Tax Commission of Utah v. Hoopes, 30 U. 2d 107,
514 p. 2d 221.

CONCLUSION
That portion of the Utah income tax law allowing
married couples to file joint returns and be taxed at a lesser
rate than other persons does not deny uniformity of the law,
agual prot-ction of the law or the freedoms of religion or
conscience nor is it a special or private law.
The classification does have a reasonable and uniform
basis, i.e., ability to pay and the law acts uniformly.
Since the District Court's denial was fair

and proper, i t

should be upheld.
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DATED this

day of October, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,

BRUCE M. HALE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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copy of the foregoing Brief to Mr. Warren S. \vright, Appellant,
3090 South 1200 West, Salt Lake City, Utah

84119, on this

day of October, 1978.
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